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Abstract: This paper explores the influence of the economic cycle on labour mobility within 
the EU, focusing on the likely impact of the present economic crisis. To do so, we use an 
econometrically calibrated simulation and a case study of Ireland. We find that, in the short 
run, the crisis is likely to lead to a somewhat lower stock of migrants from the new member 
states in the EU15 than would have been the case without the crisis on account of 
diminished job opportunities for migrants. By contrast, in the longer run the crisis might lead 
to a moderate increase in migration from some of the new member states compared to 
what would have been the case without the crisis. The latter is driven by the observation 
that the crisis may have undermined the economic growth model of some of the new 
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1. Introduction 
Economic migration generally leads to an improved allocation of productive resources, 
thereby increasing global output. This is achieved by workers moving from locations where 
their earnings and productivity is relatively low to locations where their earnings and 
productivity prospects are higher. The eastern enlargement of the EU has been a success 
story in this respect as recent studies show. Brücker et al. (2009) estimate that the migration 
of one million persons from eight new member states in central and eastern Europe which 
joined the EU in May 2004 has raised the GDP of the enlarged EU through this mechanism by 
0.2 percent or € 24 billion (for similar evidence see Barrell et al., 2007). And these gains 
could double in the next decade in a business-as-usual scenario.  
However, what global and European economies are experiencing during the present crisis is 
anything but business as usual. Historic experience teaches us that, in times of economic 
crisis, there is a political temptation to engage in protectionism not only with respect to 
trade but also with respect to migration (see O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999), which has the 
potential to exacerbate the crisis further as happened during the Great Depression. 
Fortunately, history will not repeat itself, because of much better awareness of the dangers 
of protectionism and because of better institutions that help resist the temptations of 
protectionism. These institutions include the WTO but also the EU with its four freedoms of 
the EU’s single market that assure, among other things, free movement of workers within 
the EU.  
Notwithstanding the free mobility principle, which does not yet fully apply to all citizens of 
the new member states1 because many countries of the EU15 maintain temporary 
restrictions, the protectionist mood is on the rise. As unemployment in the EU increases 
substantially over the coming months, immigration and labour mobility within the EU are set 
to become the subject of intensified public scrutiny. Already, news reports of political 
tensions regarding labour mobility within the EU have become more frequent even in those 
countries that welcomed migrants from the new member states with open arms 
immediately following accession, such as Ireland and the UK. Those immigrants who keep 
their jobs will be accused of taking away the jobs of natives. And those immigrants who lose 
their jobs and claim unemployment benefits will be accused of living off the taxes of natives. 
Challenging this flawed ‘heads you win, tails I lose’ view of migration will not be easy 
politically. 
It is against this background that the present report examines the role of migration in the 
economic cycle and specifically in the present economic and financial crisis. In particular, we 
explore how the present crisis may affect the scale of East-West migration in the enlarged 
EU and, as a consequence, the economic benefits from labour mobility.  
                                                          
1 In this paper we consider the ten central and eastern European (CEE) new member states of the EU. For 
Cyprus and Malta data are typically not available, these two countries are very small and these countries did 
not face any temporary migration restriction after their 2004 EU entry.  
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When an economic shock is asymmetric (see Blanchard and Katz, 1992, and Decressin and 
Fatas, 1995), the response to the critics of migration is comparatively easy. In that case, 
migration essentially allows people from the hard-hit areas to move to booming areas with 
the potential substantially to reduce unemployment overall. However, even then the story is 
somewhat less clear-cut when real estate bubbles are involved, since migrants enhance the 
supply of construction capacity as construction workers but also increase the demand for 
housing.  
The argument becomes more complicated in the current crisis since the European 
economies are all facing an adverse economic shock at the same time. Unemployment is 
going up everywhere and immigration, while not the cause of the problem, cannot 
contribute as much to absorbing the economic shock as it could if the shock was asymmetric. 
In principle, one might even be tempted to argue that the present synchronised shock will 
end up having little impact on worker mobility within Europe at all. From the perspective of 
migrants, it could be argued that the shock does little to change the relative attractiveness 
of different places because, given its synchronised nature, it hits all locations with similar 
force. On the policy front, there might not be that many changes either since those countries 
that have already introduced full worker mobility cannot now back-track and those EU15 
countries like Germany which still rely on the transitional restrictions for worker mobility 
had typically announced even before the crisis that they anyway planned to uphold the 
restrictions until the final deadline in 2011 (and 2014 for Bulgaria and Romania). 
Based on the arguments put forward so far, the following question naturally arises: will the 
economic crisis have any impact at all on worker mobility between the new and old member 
states? There are two main reasons suggesting that the crisis will in fact impact migration 
flows in the coming years.   
• First, migration theory and the experience from previous business cycles 
demonstrate that changes in the economic situation in the destination countries 
influence migration in different ways compared to changes of a comparable size in 
the countries of departure. The reason is that migration is not only driven by the 
earnings differential, but also by job opportunities in the destination countries that 
translate into lower job search costs. These are in turn determined by the 
unemployment rate, as standard job search models indicate (see eg Damm and 
Rosholm, 2003). Since job opportunities in the EU15 are diminishing, so is the scope 
for migration. Moreover, migrants face a higher unemployment risk than natives. For 
a variety of reasons, including typically less seniority, occupational 
overrepresentation in cyclical sectors such as construction and possibly 
discrimination, migrants have a greater risk of being made redundant than natives as 
firms adjust employment in an economic downturn. Consequently, return migration 
stands to increase in the course of an economic down-turn even where a down-turn 
is simultaneously occurring in the sending country too. This has implications for the 
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adjustment of the enlarged EU to the economic crisis. While the adjustment of 
migration will reduce labour supply in the receiving countries relative to the no-crisis 
counterfactual and thus alleviate the economic shock in the receiving countries, the 
labour-market impact in the sending countries is aggravated in the short run.  
 
• Second, it is simply not true that every country is hit equally hard both in a short-run 
and a long-run perspective. Countries with bursting real estate bubbles or a large 
financial sector are currently suffering from country-specific shocks that can to some 
extent be alleviated by migration. Key destinations for migrants from the new 
member states such as Ireland, the UK and Spain are more than proportionally 
affected in the EU15. Poland, from which the largest number of migrants arrived in 
the EU15 before the crisis, has been affected less so far, on the other hand. At the 
same time some new member states, especially Hungary and the Baltic states, are 
suffering severely from the consequences of the crisis and those countries that run 
double-digit current-account deficits will probably have to confront a slowdown in 
the catching-up process. Hence, we may expect increased migration from these 
countries in the medium term as a consequence of the present crisis.  
 
In order to assess the two main channels above, we first look at available evidence on the 
effects of the crisis on migration in the EU15 using the example of Ireland and then estimate 
and simulate formal econometric models. In particular, we estimate a panel error correction 
model to explore how traditional determinants of migration and the economic cycle interact 
in influencing migration flows. We then set up growth and employment scenarios for the 
EU15 and the new member states and use these scenarios and the estimated panel error 
correction model to simulate future migration flows. 
Our analysis confirms that both channels are significant. In the short run, the rapidly 
deteriorating job prospects for migrants in the receiving countries – Ireland and the UK in 
particular – are likely to depress the stocks of migrants below the level one would have 
expected without the crisis. In that sense, labour mobility can be said to act to some extent 
as a short-term buffer for the labour markets in the receiving countries while imposing some 
additional stress on the labour markets in sending countries.  
In a medium-term perspective, however, there are two effects that need to be highlighted. 
The first one is relevant for all new member states while the second one is relevant for those 
countries that will face a slowdown in the catching-up process. 
First, our simulation indicates that migration from all new member states will probably drop 
in the next few years but that the migration stock will revert in about a decade to our 
baseline. This implies that, while migration will be lower in the short run, migration will be 
larger in the medium term and will reach practically the same level of migrant stock. 
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Second, the new member states are expected to fare differently as a result of the crisis in 
the longer term. Four countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) might 
end up performing even better than the EU15, at least in the short run. By contrast, we 
argue that the economic crisis may slow down the catching-up process of at least the other 
six new member states. This could lead eventually to higher migration from the new 
member states overall to the EU15 than would have been expected without the crisis. In 
that sense, labour mobility insures the populations in the new member states that suffer 
most from the crisis against the possibility of lower-speed catch-up with the EU15.  
While these effects are discernible in our simulation, they are relatively small compared to 
overall migrant stocks and flows. We conclude that there is little reason to be alarmed about 
labour mobility in the EU during the present crisis and that in certain ways labour mobility 
can indeed be expected to help cope with the fallout of the crisis despite the fact that the 
crisis is affecting all EU economies at the same time.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we briefly survey 
the literature on migration after the 2004 enlargement and discuss its macroeconomic 
impacts under EMU, using Ireland as an instructive example. The third section details an 
empirical regression we use to capture the drivers of migration within the EU, incorporating 
cyclical explanatory variables. The fourth section discusses the historical impact of EU 
enlargement on East-West migration flows. The fifth section develops and discusses 
different scenarios that capture growth and employment prospects in the EU15 and the new 
member states of eastern Europe. The sixth section provides the results of our simulations, 
predicting the likely impact of the current crisis on migration until 2020 on the basis of our 
migration regression and the various growth scenarios. Finally, section seven provides a brief 
summary of our findings. 
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2. Migration in the enlarged EU 
2.1. Migration trends and expectations 
In the past decade there has been a rapid build-up in EU15 of immigration from the new 
member states of central and eastern Europe. To an important extent this occurred even 
before eight countries of central and eastern Europe (the NMS8) joined the EU on 1 May 
2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007, as can be seen in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Immigration from the 10 new member states of central and eastern Europe 
(stock as a percentage of resident population) 
 
Source: Brücker et al. (2009). 
The various factors that led to marked differences in the build-up of immigrant stock in EU15 
have been much discussed in the literature (see European Commission, 2008, and Brücker et 
al., 2009, for recent accounts). Clearly, the previously booming economies in Ireland, Spain, 
and the UK were particularly attractive to immigrants and these countries opened up their 
labour markets relatively early.2 Also, geographic and cultural proximity played a role, for 
                                                          
2 Sweden also opend up its labour market in 2004, but the more regulated labour markets, the higher language 
barrier, and the slightly less dynamic growth prospects meant that migration from the new member states to 
Sweden remained limited. 
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example in attracting many Romanians to Italy. Finally, some diversion was occurring. In 
particular, Germany and Austria have opted for a relatively restrictive immigration policy in 
recent years, albeit starting from a relatively high immigrant stock. This diverted many 
migrants from the new member states who then moved to geographically more distant 
destinations instead of Germany and Austria. Despite the rapid catching up of eastern 
Europe with the EU15, substantial net migration is set to continue for the time being, driven 
by the still-significant income differences.  
Before the eastern enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007, there was considerable debate 
about the migration flows that this would spark under the EU’s free movement of workers 
regime. Critics were fearful of massive migration flows from eastern Europe. In particular, 
there was a concern that these migrants would take away the jobs of natives and exploit 
generous welfare states in the EU15. These is why transition arrangements were introduced 
that allowed the old member states temporarily to restrict mobility for workers from eastern 
Europe for up to seven years after accession. In a number of receiving countries, these 
transition arrangements even remain in place today. At the same time advocates of free 
mobility argued that there would be huge economic gains to be reaped, but these 
arguments did not convince policymakers in some EU15 countries. 
We know that migratory movements ended up being somewhat larger than some had 
predicted, in particular for Ireland and the UK, leading to some social tension in the process 
(see for example the Commission’s Report on Five Years of Enlargement, 2009). Part of this 
difference can be explained by diversion effects since other natural destination countries 
such as Germany and Austria did not open up their labour markets at the same time. We 
know that the economic benefits have been substantial, with an estimated gain of 0.2 
percent of EU-wide GDP. There is solid evidence to suggest that the arrival of migrants has 
sparked the creation of new jobs so that the fears that migrants would essentially take away 
the jobs of natives have not been confirmed. And the data show that the propensity for 
migrants from the new member states to rely on the welfare state in the receiving country 
has been rather small to date and much lower than the critics of labour mobility had feared.  
 
2.2. Macroeconomic impact of migration under EMU 
What we also know is that migration from the new member states has been a valuable 
lubricant for the euro area, which will be discussed in more detail in the remainder of this 
section.  
The literature on the optimum currency area (OCA) has established that a high degree of 
factor mobility is needed to make it optimal for a country to give up its nominal exchange 
rate as an instrument of economic adjustment in the face of asymmetric shocks 
(Eichengreen, 1991). In theory, an economic boom in a member of a currency union puts 
upward pressure on real wages as the demand for labour rises. Immigrants, attracted by 
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improved employment prospects and higher wages, increase the supply of labour, thereby 
containing inflationary pressures. During a downturn, net outflows of non-nationals reduce 
the supply of labour, which eases the downward pressure on wages and softens the 
reduction in living standards for national residents.  
However, as mentioned in the introduction, mobility has traditionally been much lower in 
the euro area than in, say, the United States. So the concern was that perhaps mobility 
within the euro area might not be sufficient for the euro to become a success. This is where 
migration from the new member states was key. By disproportionately moving into the 
boom countries of the euro area, the relative changes in population were as if greater 
mobility within the euro area had occurred. In that sense, immigration from outside is a very 
close substitute for mobility within for the purpose of the optimum currency area argument.   
These macroeconomic benefits of migration from the new member states have been evident 
in the euro area in the past couple of years. Two of the fastest growing members of EMU 
over the past decade, Spain and Ireland, have also enjoyed the highest rates if inward 
migration. These migration flows alleviated inflationary pressures during the booms, thereby 
allowing more rapid and prolonged convergence of real GDP (Barrett and Duffy, 2008).   
One complication that is normally not considered by traditional OCA theory, but that may 
have particular relevance during the recent boom in some countries, is the effect of 
migration flows on the non-traded goods sector. While this may seem a small omission, 
developments in the non-traded sector, and the housing sector in particular, may be 
significant in explaining the recent migration experience in countries such as Ireland and 
Spain. Instead of reducing prices, large inflows of migrants could in fact push up the price of 
non-traded goods, and real estate in particular. By affecting the dynamics of housing 
markets, migration may therefore have contributed to the booms and busts in housing 
markets witnessed in many countries over the past decade. The impact of migration on 
housing markets also gives rise to wealth effects associated with changes in house prices. 
While this caveat does not fundamentally call into question the beneficial impact of labour 
mobility, it does raise the issue of how governments should best respond to the build-up of 
real estate bubbles in a currency union (see Ahearne et al., 2008). 
To explore further both the macroeconomic context of the recent immigration build-up and 
future dynamics of labour mobility in the crisis, we provide a case study of Ireland. Like Spain 
and the UK, Ireland experienced rapid economic growth, large immigration flows, and a 
property boom over recent years.  Ireland is a particularly suitable example because of the 
rapid immigration build-up from eastern Europe in the recent past and because of the 
extremely rapid change in its economic outlook in the past year that occurred somewhat 
before the downturn in most other EU15 countries. Thus, the Irish experience may to some 
extent help to anticipate what will – in a somewhat milder form -- be the immigration impact 
of the crisis elsewhere. Moreover, unlike the UK, Ireland is a member of EMU, which adds 
another dimension to the country’s experience. 
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2.3. Case study of Ireland 
Ireland represents a potentially useful case study of an economy in a currency union with a 
very open labour market that has experienced large macroeconomic shocks. The Irish 
economy enjoyed extraordinarily rapid growth in real GDP, averaging roughly seven percent 
annually over the period 1994-2007. This performance saw living standards in Ireland 
converge rapidly to levels in other advanced countries, with real income per capita 
increasing from about 50 percent of the US level in the early 1990s to nearly 80 percent of 
the US level and well above the EU15 average a decade-and-a-half later. Growth was 
boosted by significant inflows of foreign direct investment which raised the country’s stock 
of business capital and productivity. Membership of Economic and Monetary Union also 
spurred growth, reflecting the initial weakness of the euro versus other major currencies 
after the launch of EMU in 1999; the sharp drop in interest rates in Ireland as Irish interest 
rates converged to lower German rates in the run-up to EMU; and the greater access to 
wholesale funding that Irish banks enjoyed which facilitated a credit boom in Ireland.  
The boom in Irish economy was associated with a remarkable turn-around in the flows of   
international migration in Ireland. A long history of large net outflows of migrants gave way 
to substantial net inward migration from the late 1990s. Inflows accelerated sharply in 2004 
when the number of immigrants from eastern Europe grew substantially after EU 
enlargement.  
Growth slowed markedly in 2007 and the economic boom turned to bust in 2008. The 
turning of the housing cycle as the housing bubble burst triggered a severe contraction in 
economic activity, a collapse of housing-related tax revenues, an accompanying rapid 
deterioration in public finances and a marked reduction in the stability of the banking 
system. Employment has begun to shrink at an alarming rate and unemployment has soared 
at an unprecedented pace. The international credit crisis compounded these problems by 
adding to the stress on the banks, by pushing many of Ireland’s largest trading partners into 
recession and by precipitating a sharp rise in the value of the euro against sterling and the 
dollar. Although data on migration flows during the ongoing bust period are not yet 
available, this section examines recently released labour market data and some anecdotal 
information in an attempt to shed light on how the economic adjustment now underway in 
the Irish economy is affecting migrants – and how that adjustment process is being affected 
by possible changes in the pattern of migration. 
 
2.3.1. Migration flows during the boom 
During the boom, Ireland experienced a dramatic swing from average annual net outward 
migration of about 40,000 in the late 1980s when the Irish economy was still suffering from 
a decade-long slump and high levels of unemployment (Figure 2). Net inward migration of 
 11
between 20,000-40,000 (equivalent to 0.5-1.0 percent of the population) was recorded 
annually over the period 2000-2004. Following the accession of the new EU member states 
in 2004, net inward migration jumped and peaked at 72,000 in 2006. 
 
Figure 2: Ireland – Estimated population migration (thousands) 
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Source: CSO. Data for 2007 and 2008 are ESRI estimates.  
 
Data for net migration from the EU accession states are only available from 2005. Those data 
show that in 2005 the accession states accounted for 60 percent of Ireland’s total net 
migration. That share increased in 2006 and 2007 so that roughly two-thirds of net migration 
came from accession states in those years.  
In terms of employment by sector, workers from the new accession states are 
disproportionately represented in manufactured industries, hotels and restaurants and 
construction compared with Irish nationals and national from EU15 countries (Table 1). 
Workers from the new accession states are underrepresented in banking and finance and in 
the public sector. 
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Table 1:  Ireland – Distribution of workers by industrial group and nationality (percent) 
Industrial Group 
 
Irish nationals UK EU15 
(excl. Irl. & 
UK) 
NMS10 
 
Rest of 
world 
Agriculture, 
forestry and fishing 
5.3 2.1 1.6 3.9 2.0 
Mining, quarrying 
and turf production 
0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 
Manufacturing 
industries 
13.1 13.8 14.9 21.4 11.7 
Electricity, gas and 
water supply 
0.7 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 
Construction 11.7 11.6 4.4 20.8 8.3 
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
14.4 15.3 9.7 17.0 11.7 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
4.3 6.2 14.2 16.5 17.0 
Transport, storage 
and 
communications 
6.1 5.7 7.0 3.7 3.6 
Banking and 
financial services 
5.0 4.6 6.4 0.9 2.8 
Business activities 9.6 12.8 24.3 9.0 12.9 
Public 
administration and 
defence 
6.3 2.4 1.5 0.2 1.4 
Education 7.7 6.6 6.1 0.6 3.1 
Health and social 
work 
10.8 11.8 5.7 2.4 20.8 
Other community,    
social 
4.5 6.1 3.7 3.1 4.3 
 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: NMS 10 refers to the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004. 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Ireland. 
2.3.2. Labour market adjustment during the bust: locals versus migrants 
Data for migration flows for 2008 are not yet available. As shown previously, the Economic 
and Social Research Institute (ESRI) estimate that net migration declined to 38,500 in 2008 
from 67,000 in 2007. The fall reflects an easing in gross inward migration from 110,000 to 
84,000. The slowing in inward migration occurred against a backdrop of a 0.5 percent fall in 
total employment and an increase in the unemployment rate from 4.5 percent in 2007 to 6.5 
percent in 2008. The estimates for migration are consistent with data on registrations for 
work. All employees in Ireland require a Personal Public Service (PPS) number. Figures show 
that 33,200 people from the EU accession states were granted PPS numbers between July 
and December 2008, a fall of 47 per cent on the same period in 2007. The trend was 
particularly striking among Polish migrants, with their take-up of PPS numbers falling by 53 
per cent in the second half of 2008. For the year as a whole, the number of Poles registering 
was down by one-half from the year before (Figure 3). Fewer Poles registered in December 
2008 than in any month since their country joined the EU in May 2004. 
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Figure 3: Ireland – Worker registrations from Poland 
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Source: Department of Social and Family Affairs 
 
Net migration is expected to turn negative in 2009, marking the first net outflow since 1995. 
The ESRI is forecasting net outward migration of 50,000, compared with a projected drop in 
total employment of about 120,000 to below 2 million by the end of the year. In addition to 
migration, this fall in employment will be reflected in changes in unemployment and labour 
force participation.  
Evidence about the role of migrants in the ongoing adjustment in Ireland’s labour market is 
provided by data on claims for unemployment insurance (UI).  In the year to January 2009, 
the number of people claiming UI jumped roughly 80 percent to nearly 328,000 claimants. 
Table 2 shows how the overall rise in UI claimants breaks down between Irish nationals and 
non-Irish nationals, as well as the breakdown of non-Irish nationals by nationality.  In 
January 2009 there were 263,527 Irish nationals and 64,334 non-Irish nationals claiming UI. 
Compared with the same month a year earlier, the number of Irish national claimants had 
risen 71 percent, while the corresponding annual increase for non-Irish nationals was 143 
percent. Among non-Irish nationals the largest number of claimants were nationals from the 
EU accession states (35,826) while the smallest number were from the EU15 states outside 
Ireland and the UK (3,651). 
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Table 2: Ireland – Nationality of persons claiming unemployment insurance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)= 
(1)+(2)+(3)+(4) 
(6) (7)=(5)+(6) 
 UK EU 15 
excl. Irl. 
and UK 
NMS10 Other 
nationals 
Non-Irish 
nationals  
  
Irish  
nationals 
Total 
January 
2007 
7,545 1,517 4,198 5,882 19,142 139,610 158,752 
February 7,569 1,527 4,696 5,890 19,682 139,717 159,399 
March 7,483 1,447 5,242 5,678 19,850 136,019 155,869 
April 7,401 1,458 5,386 5,593 19,838 134,481 154,319 
May 7,367 1,462 5,506 5,743 20,078 133,932 154,010 
June 7,841 1,567 5,860 6,453 21,721 144,642 166,363 
July 8,137 1,614 6,139 6,601 22,491 152,103 174,594 
August 8,246 1,640 6,544 6,627 23,057 151,149 174,206 
September 7,732 1,497 6,326 5,902 21,457 138,994 160,451 
October 7,612 1,473 6,542 5,408 21,035 136,414 157,449 
November 7,851 1,516 7,433 5,439 22,239 139,483 161,722 
December 8,150 1,610 7,934 5,540 23,234 147,142 170,376 
January 
2008 
8,756 1,759 10,064 5,909 26,488 154,961 181,449 
February 9,073 1,858 12,545 6,247 29,723 159,762 189,485 
March 9,349 1,959 13,403 6,408 31,119 166,873 197,992 
April 9,401 1,921 14,166 6,483 31,971 163,627 195,598 
May 9,600 1,945 14,738 6,996 33,279 168,477 201,756 
June 10,268 2,146 15,623 7,831 35,868 184,943 220,811 
July 10,969 2,327 16,953 8,215 38,464 199,776 238,240 
August 11,426 2,446 18,581 8,648 41,101 206,283 247,384 
September 11,186 2,419 19,381 8,228 41,214 199,003 240,217 
October 11,584 2,654 22,285 8,077 44,600 207,351 251,951 
November 12,372 2,902 26,089 8,513 49,876 218,710 268,586 
December 13,279 3,211 28,950 9,015 54,455 236,908 291,363 
January 
2009 
14,807 3,651 35,826 10,050 64,334 263,527 327,861 
Note: NMS 10 refers to the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004. 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Live Register for January 2009. 
 
The share of non-Irish nationals among all persons claiming UL rose to nearly 20 percent in 
January 2009 from 12 percent in the same month two years earlier. Non-Irish nationals are 
overrepresented as UI claimants compared to their share of the labour force. Estimates from 
the Quarterly National Household Survey for June to August 2008 show that non-Irish 
nationals represented an estimated 16 percent of all persons in the labour force aged 
between 17 and 65 years (the relevant age range for claiming UI). In other words, the 
probability of non-Irish nationals losing their jobs and becoming an UI claimant would 
appear to be markedly higher than for Irish nationals. 
While these Irish data may to some extent be influenced by the rapidly contracting Irish 
construction section, the Irish experience suggests two ways in which migrants are acting as 
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a buffer to reduce the impact of the economic shock on the native workforce. First, the fact 
that foreign workers are more likely to lose their job than Irish workers implies that Irish 
workers have to bear a less-than-proportional part of the labour market adjustment in the 
crisis. Second, as reflected in the ESRI forecast of net negative migration in 2009, the rapidly 
deteriorating job prospects for foreign workers is inducing many of them to return home 
despite the fact that Irish wages continue to be much higher than those in the source 
country.  
 
 
3. The cyclical nature of migration: a panel regression model 
 
The Irish case study presented in the previous section allowed us to draw some tentative 
conclusions about the cyclical nature of migration in a particular country. In this section we 
aim to estimate formal econometric models for a wide panel of countries to explore how 
traditional determinants of migration and the economic cycle interact in influencing 
migration flows. Using this framework, we will in later sections of our paper present 
scenarios of future migration flows and simulate the effects of the current crisis on migration 
from the new member states to the EU15. 
 
3.1. The model: theoretical background and the long-run migration function 
Following the literature on macroeconomic migration functions, we apply a parsimonious 
specification of the migration model for our empirical analysis. The theoretical approach 
follows the temporary migration framework with heterogeneous agents originally developed 
by Brücker and Schröder (2006). Individuals have the choice to stay at home or to move for a 
certain period of their life time (or their entire life) to another country. They choose the 
length of the stay in the foreign country such that they maximise utility over their life time. 
The utility of individuals depends on their earnings in the respective locations, but also on 
non-monetary factors such as social relations, cultural links, etc. At a given difference in the 
net present value of earnings, the time spent abroad depends on the weight individuals 
assign to monetary earnings and to the non-pecuniary factors relevant for their utility in the 
respective locations (for similar models see Djajic and Milbourne, 1986, and Dustmann and 
Kirchkamp, 2002). Under the assumption that these preferences are not uniform across 
individuals, an equilibrium relationship between migration stocks and the difference in 
income levels between the host and the home country emerges. At this equilibrium, the 
gross emigration rate and the gross return migration rate are equal, such that net migration 
ceases (Brücker and Schröder, 2006). 
The long-run macro migration function is specified in the following form: 
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where m*i,EU-15,t denotes the long-run or equilibrium share of migrants residing in the EU15 
population from sending country i (we will shortly discuss the rationale behind modelling the 
migration stock in the EU15 and not in individual receiving countries), yEU15,t and yi,t the 
natural log of the wage rate in the destination and the sending country, eEU-15,t and e,jt the 
natural log of the employment rate in the EU15 and the sending countries, xi,EU-15,t a vector 
of institutional variables, which capture migration conditions between sending country i and 
the EU15, η the corresponding vector of coefficients, and tEUi ,15,ε  is the error term. Finally, 
the subscript EU15 denotes the EU15, i the index of sending countries and t the time index. 
The wage rate is approximated by the GDP per capita expressed in euros (and ECUs before 
1999) at current exchange rates but in 2000 prices, and the employment rate is defined as 
)1ln( ,, tjtj ue −= , ie as the natural logarithm of one minus the unemployment rate in country 
j. As institutional variables we consider dummy variables for the 2004 EU enlargement, a 
guest worker dummy which captures bilateral migration agreements between Spain and 
Italy on the one hand and Bulgaria and Romania on the other hand, for migration restrictions 
vis-à-vis non-EU countries, for the emigration restrictions during the regimes of the Iron 
Curtain for the countries of the former communist bloc, and for the civil war in former 
Yugoslavia. 
The variables of the model are derived from the standard human capital model, ie the utility 
is determined by expectations about income levels, which are in turn conditioned by 
employment opportunities. Utility is concave in (expected) earnings, which implicitly 
accounts for the fact that other, non-monetary arguments enter the utility function. 
Individuals are risk averse, but uncertainty focuses on employment opportunities. Hence, it 
is expected that the coefficient for the employment rate in the receiving country is larger 
than the coefficient for the employment rate in the home country (Hatton, 1995). 
Choosing the migration stock instead of the migration flow as the dependent variable on the 
left-hand side of equation (1) has important implications for migration forecasts. While 
standard models based on the assumption of a representative agent predict that migration 
flows continue until the income difference meets a certain threshold level where the 
difference in net earnings equals migration costs, models with heterogeneous agents predict 
that net migration ceases when migration stocks have achieved their equilibrium levels, 
even if income differences are high and persistent. The latter way to model the macro 
migration function helps to understand why the EU’s southern enlargement did not trigger 
any migration flows although income differences were considerable: the migration stocks 
which had been accumulated before enlargement were already at, or even above, their 
equilibrium levels. In contrast, in the case of the EU’s eastern enlargement, larger migration 
flows were to be expected since the Iron Curtain and immigration restrictions applied in the 
receiving countries prevented migration stocks being close to their equilibrium levels before 
enlargement. 
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3.2. Modelling the adjustment to the business cycle 
Equation (1) captures the long-run equilibrium of migration stocks as determined by the 
long-run values of the explanatory variables. The short-term dynamics of the model depends 
on the formation of expectations and adjustment costs. A flexible way to model the short-
term dynamics is an error-correction mechanism (ECM), which is compatible with different 
theories on the formation of expectations and adjustment under uncertainty about the 
future (see eg Hatton, 1995, for a formal derivation of an ECM from a rational-expectations 
model in the migration context). This enables us to model both the adjustment of the 
migration stock to fluctuations of the income and employment variables in the course of the 
business cycle as well as the long-run equilibrium level in one equation. 
The error-correction model which forms the basis of our estimates has the form 
tEUitEUitEUitititEUtEU
tititEUtEUtEUitEUitEUi
xxeeee
yyyymmm
,15,,15,1,15,,101,91,581,57
,61,51,541,531,15,21,15,1,15,
νδηββββ
ββββββ
+∆′+′+∆++∆++
+∆++∆++∆+=∆
−−−−
−−−−−
      (2) 
where ∆ denotes the first-difference operator and νi,EU-15,t the error term. The error term is 
specified here as a one-way error component model with country-specific fixed effects. Note 
that standard fixed-effects estimators have proved to provide smaller forecasting errors in 
the migration context than pooled estimators and more sophisticated GMM and 
heterogeneous estimation techniques (Brücker/Siliverstovs, 2006a, 2006b). Moreover, we 
allowed for residual autocorrelation and adopted a heteroscedasticity robust covariance 
matrix. 
While the long-run equilibrium stock of migrants is determined by income levels and 
employment rate levels in the EU15 and the sending countries, the short-run dynamics of 
the migration flows depend on changes in these variables. Business-cycle effects and 
economic shocks are thus captured by the change in incomes and the change in the 
employment rate. Note that inclusion of the variables of destination and of sending 
countries separately enables us to identify the different impact of the fluctuation of 
economic variables in receiving and sending countries. 
 
3.3. Dealing with third-country effects and migration diversion 
Almost all migration models tempt to explain bilateral migration movements between 
receiving and sending countries by a set of bilateral variables. Explicitly or implicitly these 
models ignore migration conditions in third countries. Technically this is called the 
‘irrelevance of independent alternatives’ (IIA) assumption, ie that the choice of one 
destination does not depend on other destinations. This assumption is particularly 
problematic in the eastern enlargement context. The fact that key destination countries such 
as Germany and Austria have maintained their immigration restrictions while the UK and 
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Ireland have opened their labour markets has certainly triggered additional immigration 
flows to the latter destinations. Similarly, changing economic or social conditions in one 
destination may also affect the scale of migration to other destinations. However, if the 
‘irrelevance of independent alternatives’ assumption is violated, we obtain biased results. 
Considering all potential alternatives is, however, hardly possible in a migration model. We 
have thus chosen a simplified approach. Instead of estimating the model in equation (2) for 
bilateral country pairs, we estimate migration from a number of destinations into the entire 
EU15, assuming that the choice to move to the EU15 is independent from other possible 
destinations. Since the overwhelming share of the migrants from the NMS (new member 
states) and the other countries included in the sample moves to the EU15, ignoring other 
destinations does not seem to be too restrictive. By treating the EU15 as a single destination 
country we circumvent the IIA problem and should obtain consistent estimates of the 
parameters, as long as other alternative destinations outside the EU do not affect the scale 
of migration into the EU15, and as long the EU15 countries are relatively homogeneous in 
their characteristics such that a change in the regional structure of migration within the EU 
does not significantly affect overall migration into the EU15. 
 
3.4. Data 
Our sample consists of 28 sending countries during the period 1983 to 2006: the ‘old’ EU 
member states with the exception of Luxembourg (14), the then new member states from 
central and eastern Europe, former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. This sample 
thus covers - with the exception of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries 
- the entire European continent and some main sending countries at the European 
periphery. The EU15 is the main destination for migrants from these countries such that the 
assumption of the irrelevance of independent alternatives is not too onerous. For this 
reason we have excluded the CIS countries from the sample, since ethnic disentangling plays 
an important role there. Other destinations such as Russia are important alternatives to the 
EU15 in case of the CIS. Altogether, our sample covers more than 80 per cent of the 
immigrants residing in the EU15. Due to data limitations, the panel is not balanced. We can 
include only those sending countries for which (almost) the entire EU15 report migration 
stocks and hence we could not cover the entire time period for all sending countries. In 
particular, data for the new member states starts in the mid 1990s only.  
The data on migration stocks are derived from the statistics of the EU15 destination 
countries. Whenever possible, we have used the national population statistics, and the 
Eurostat Labour Force Survey in the remaining cases. However, in order to avoid structural 
breaks we rely only on one data source for a given destination. These data have then been 
aggregated to calculate the number of migrants in the EU15. Since national data sources and 
nationality concepts differ across the EU, some measurement error is unavoidable. 
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As an approximation of average earnings we have used GDP per capita. We employed in our 
regressions GDP per capita both at purchasing power parities and at current exchange rates 
(both were included at constant 2000 prices and the available US dollar figures were 
converted to euros). Since the estimation results of the income variable at current exchange 
rates has turned out to be better than those for income measured at purchasing power 
parities, we decided to use GDP per capita at current exchange rates in the regressions 
presented here. Note that GDP at current exchange rates affects migration decisions 
particularly in the case of temporary migration, since a part of the income is consumed in 
home countries. Moreover, measurement error for GDP per capita at current exchange rates 
is likely to be smaller compared to purchasing power parity estimates. GDP per capita at 
current exchange rates was taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2008), while GDP per capita at purchasing power parity was derived from the series provided 
by Angus Maddison and the University of Groningen, which was extrapolated from the Wold 
Bank series. This data is available in US dollars, but in order to exclude the euro/dollar 
exchange rate swings from the GDP per capita at current exchange rate series, we converted 
them to euro using Eurostat euro and ECU exchange rates against the dollar.  
For the calculation of employment rates we used the standardised unemployment rates (ILO 
norm) provided by Eurostat, plus national statistical sources in some cases. The population 
figures have been taken from Eurostat.  
The institutional variables are defined as follows: NMS8it is a dummy variable which has a 
value of 1 starting in 2004 for the 8 eastern European countries that joined the EU in that 
year and of zero otherwise; GUESTit is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 if migration 
from Bulgaria and Romania is facilitated by bilateral guestworker agreements and of zero 
otherwise;3 RESTRICTit is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 if the country does not 
participate in the free movement of the EU and the EEA and if immigration is not facilitated 
either by transitional arrangements for the free movement or by guestworker agreements; 
IRONit is a dummy variable which has a value of 1 if emigration is effectively hindered by the 
Iron Curtain regimes and of zero otherwise. 
Several aspects are important to note in this context. The institutional variables considered 
here are of course only rough approximations of the institutional conditions in the EU15. For 
example, we are not able to capture changes in the application of the transitional 
arrangements during 2004-2007 in individual EU member states, ie countries which decided 
to open their labour markets during the course of the sample period. This would require 
including a dummy variable and the respective interaction dummy variables for each year 
since 2004, which would in turn make any identification impossible. A similar argument 
applies for changes of immigration policies of the EU15 vis-à-vis Bulgaria and Romania during 
the phase which we characterise here as influenced by bilateral migration agreements. 
                                                          
3 This holds for Bulgaria and Romania in the years from 1998 until the end of the sample period. The 
traditional source countries of guestworker recruitment in the EU such as Spain, Portugal and Turkey were 
not subject to such agreements during the sample period. 
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However, in our view these changes in immigration policies during the 2004-2007 period did 
not affect migration flows from the NMS8 and the NMS2 much, such that our identification 
strategy captures the main changes in the immigration regimes of the EU15 during the 
sample period. A more detailed consideration of the institutional regimes would require 
estimating the model as a panel of destination and sending countries, which would in turn 
run into the difficulty of employing the irrelevance of independent alternatives assumption. 
This would yield extremely biased results if migration in one EU15 country is affected in one 
way or another by the immigration policies of other EU15 countries, which in our view is 
certainly the case in the context of the EU’s eastern enlargement.  
3.5. Estimation Results 
The estimation results are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3: Estimation results for the panel error correction model 
 unconstrained model constrained model 
1,15, −tEUim  -0.1389 -0.1434 
 (0.0836) (0.0843) 
1,15, −∆ tEUim  -0.3684 -0.3731 
 (0.1421) (0.1398) 
1,15 −tEUy  0.0034 0.0023 
 (0.0015) (0.0012) 
1, −tiy  -0.0024 -0.0017 
 (0.0013) (0.0011) 
tEUy ,15∆  0.0156 0.0124 
 (0.0097) (0.0073) 
tiy ,∆  -0.0023 0 
 (0.0015)  
1,15 −tEUe  0.0189 0.0232 
 (0.0129) (0.0124) 
1, −tie  -0.0089 -0.0084 
 (0.0049) (0.0045) 
1,15 −∆ tEUe  -0.0027 0 
 (0.0242)  
1, −∆ tie  -0.0010 0 
 (0.0074)  
R2 0.40 0.39 
No. obs. 472 475 
χ2-fixed effects 44.45 42.79 
P (0.019) (0.027) 
Note: The estimated model is described in equation (2) and also includes the lagged values and current period 
changes of dummies for various migration regimes as described in the main text and fixed effects. Residual 
autocorrelation is allowed and a heteroskedasticity robust covariance matrix was adopted. ‘χ2-fixed effects’ is a 
likelihood ratio test for redundant fixed effects. 
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With the exception of the highly insignificant parameter of 1,15 −∆ tEUe , all other parameters 
had the sign one would expect from first principles. Furthermore, most of the parameters 
were significant with the exception of 1,15 −∆ tEUe , 1, −∆ tie  and tiy ,∆ . These three variables were 
hence dropped altogether from the final specification and the model was re-estimated, 
which is shown in the second column of Table 3. 
The results show that EU15 variables have larger parameters in absolute terms than 
variables of the sending countries (even though the sum of the two coefficients is typically 
not significantly different from zero), indicating that the economic situation in the EU15 
plays a crucial role in migration decisions. Among the short-run effects, the change in EU15 
income is itself a significant determinant, but not the change in income in the sending 
countries, nor the change in employment. However, through the error-correction 
mechanism, the deviation from the long-run equilibrium matters in the short run and hence 
employment conditions are also determinants of short-run changes in migration. 
 
 
4. The effect of the 2004 EU enlargement on migration 
It is a widely held view that the 2004 EU enlargement led to a massive rise in migration from 
the new member states to the EU15 and especially to the UK and Ireland. Both opened up 
their labour markets at that time. However, even before the 2004 enlargement there was 
already a large and growing stock of migrants from these countries in the EU and it is 
reasonable to assume that without enlargement migration would have increased further. 
We can use the estimated model of the previous section to assess the effect of enlargement 
on migration. This obviously relates to the eight countries that joined in 2004 (NMS8). For 
Bulgaria and Romania (NMS2) the related question is the effect of the guest worker 
agreement. 
To this end we run two simulations. First, we dynamically simulate the model for 2004-2006 
using the (unaltered) explanatory variables to have a benchmark prediction for migration, 
conditional on the model and the explanatory variables. Next, we run a counterfactual 
dynamic simulation in which we have set the EU enlargement (for NMS8) and quest worker 
agreement (for the NMS2) dummies to zero for 2004-2006. The difference between the two 
simulations indicates the effect of EU enlargement (for the NMS8) and the guest worker 
agreement (for the NMS2) on migration from these countries to the EU15.  
Table 4 below shows our simulation results, and we also included the actual change in the 
migrant stock in the EU15. The table confirms that the 2004 EU enlargement indeed 
substantially boosted migration according to our model estimations. The guest worker 
agreement for Bulgaria and Romania also had a sizeable effect on migration. Migration in 
excess of the model’s enlargement effect can be attributed basically to two broad factors: 
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(1) the weaknesses of the model (eg possible misspecification, estimation errors, data 
problems, etc.), (2) the effect of included variables (ie income differences, employment 
opportunities) that would have attracted migrants from the new member states even 
without enlargement.  
Table 4: The effect of the 2004 EU enlargement and guest workers agreement on migration 
 NMS8 NMS2 
 
Model: the 
cumulative effect of 
the 2004 EU 
enlargement on 
migration stock in the 
EU15 
Actual cumulative 
change in the stock 
of migrants in the 
EU15 compared to 
2003 
Model: the cumulative 
effect of the guest 
worker agreement on 
migration stock in the 
EU15 since 2003 
Actual cumulative 
change in the stock 
of migrants in the 
EU15 compared to 
2003 
2004 197,442 144,542 198,542 266,703 
2005 424,700 427,119 389,676 458,340 
2006 607,983 807,764 554,570 647,427 
Source: Authors’ calculation.  
According to the findings presented in Table 4, the 2004 EU enlargement can explain roughly 
three quarters of the historically observed increase in immigrant stock in the EU15. In other 
words, we estimate that, without enlargement, the migration flows would have been 75 
percent lower during the period under consideration, namely 2004-2006. The impact of the 
guest worker agreements for Bulgaria and, more importantly, Romania is estimated to be 
even more significant, explaining about 80 percent of the observed migration flows since 
2003. These results strongly underline the positive effects of EU enlargement on migration.  
 
5. Growth and employment scenarios 
In order to be able to use the estimated model of Section 3 for assessing the impact of the 
present economic crisis on migration, we need to establish scenarios for future growth and 
labour market developments in the EU which is the purpose of this section.  
We would like to emphasize that our aim is not to provide forecasts for economic growth 
and employment. Our goal is to set up hypothetical medium term scenarios that can be used 
to asses the prospects for medium term migration flows. Due to the large degree of 
uncertainty of possible medium term economic developments, we present clearly our 
assumptions and derive alternative scenarios. 
 
5.1. The effect of the crisis on catching-up prospects 
Before the crisis, ie up to 2007, the catching-up process of the new member states seemed 
to be fast and reasonably smooth. Some countries had built up various vulnerabilities, such 
as huge credit and housing booms (eg the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania) and 
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consequently high current account deficits and external debt, and it was widely expected 
that these vulnerabilities must be corrected at some point in time. However, the actual 
magnitude of the corrections, as also reflected by the fall in GDP, were amplified by the 
global financial and economic crisis. Figure 4 indicates that the real GDP catch-up compared 
to EU15 reversed in the Baltic countries and in Hungary and slowed down in all other 
countries. Bulgaria and Romania are particularly at risk because of their huge current-
account deficits and external debts and their bursting housing bubbles.4  
Consequently, the new member states can be divided into two main groups: 
• Group 1 - Less affected/vulnerable countries: Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
• Group2 – More affected/vulnerable countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary5, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Romania. 
 
Figure 4: GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU15 = 100), 1995-2010 
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Note: Values for 2009-2010 were calculated by using the April 2009 GDP growth forecasts of the European 
Commission’s DG ECFIN. Source: Eurostat, DG ECFIN, Bruegel. 
 
                                                          
4 See Darvas and Szapáry (2008) for a detailed analysis of macroeconomic developments and vulnerabilities in 
the new EU member states. 
5 Hungary did not have a double-digit current account deficit and the housing boom was also much less marked 
than in the other five highly vulnerable countries. However, Hungary had the highest general government debt 
to GDP ratio and a long history of irresponsible fiscal policy as well as severe structural weaknesses (high tax 
rates and government expenditures, inefficient and wasteful social systems, etc). For these reasons growth 
slowed down in Hungary well before the crisis and the country was the first in Europe one to ask for IMF help. 
For these reasons we put Hungary in the group of more vulnerable countries. 
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Table 5 indicates that there were substantial downward revisions in economic growth 
forecasts from October 2007 to April 2009 in all countries including the EU15. Our regression 
results in Section 3 indicated that economic conditions in the EU15 probably had a bigger 
effect on migration than economic conditions in the new member states. Consequently, 
even in the case of a parallel slowdown of similar magnitude, migration would probably still 
have decreased. 
Table 5: GDP growth forecasts made in October 2007 and April 2009 by DG ECFIN 
     
October 2007 
forecasts Actual 
April 2009 
forecasts 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bulgaria 5 6.6 6.2 6.1 6.3 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.0 -1.6 0.1 
Czech Rep. 3.6 4.5 6.4 6.4 5.8 5.0 4.9 6.0 4.4 -2.7 0.3 
Estonia 7.2 8.3 10.2 11.2 7.8 6.4 6.2 6.3 -3.6 -10.3 -0.8 
Hungary 4.2 4.8 4.1 3.9 2.0 2.6 3.4 1.1 0.5 -6.3 -0.3 
Latvia 7.2 8.7 10.6 11.9 10.5 7.2 6.2 10.0 -4.6 -13.1 -3.2 
Lithuania 10.3 7.3 7.9 7.7 8.5 7.5 6.3 8.9 3.1 -11.0 -4.7 
Poland 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.1 6.5 5.6 5.2 6.6 4.8 -1.4 0.8 
Romania 5.2 8.5 4.1 7.7 6.0 5.9 5.8 6.2 7.1 -4.0 0.0 
Slovenia 2.8 4.4 4.1 5.7 6.0 4.6 4.0 6.8 3.5 -2.6 0.7 
Slovakia 4.2 5.4 6 8.3 8.7 7.0 6.2 10.4 6.4 -3.4 0.7 
EU15 1.2 2.3 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.6 0.8 -3.9 0.0 
Note: Forecast for the EU15 is a weighted average of forecasts for the euro area, UK, Denmark and Sweden. 
Source: October 2007 and April 2009 forecasts are from the DG ECFIN of the European Commission; actual data 
is from the Eurostat.  
 
On the other hand, countries with floating exchange rates experienced depreciations, even 
countries such as Poland which did not have obvious major vulnerabilities. The Czech 
Republic, the least vulnerable non-euro area CEE country (very low share of foreign currency 
loans and low government debt) also experienced exchange-rate depreciation, especially 
after the disastrous industrial production figures for late 2008 were revealed (see Figure 6). 
It is difficult to assess whether exchange-rate depreciations reflect natural corrections of 
previous strong appreciation trends or go beyond that. However, the co-ordinated 
statements of the Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian central banks of 23 February 2009 
suggest that the macroeconomic situation of these countries does not justify such a major 
weakening of their exchange rates. 
 25
Figure 5: Nominal exchange rates against the euro, 2 January 2008 – 25 May 2009 
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Source: ECB. 
Any fall in GDP per capita at PPS relative to the EU15 increases the real income gap that can 
drive migration. But the observed currency depreciations also increase the incentive to 
migrate. The reason is that migrants consume part of their income in their home country, so 
nominal income differences also matter for the migration decision.  
Hence, the crisis rewrites effective income differences between the EU15 and most of those 
new member states that are not yet members of the euro area. As discussed earlier, 
migration can generally be expected to slow down when growth in the host country slows 
down in the cyclical down-turn. However, the prospect of damage to the catching-up 
mechanism in most of the new member states stands to increase the medium-term 
prospects for migration. 
In order to quantify the possible change in migration potential due to the crisis, we proceed 
in two steps. First, we quantify the likely change in the catching-up prospects due to the 
crisis, and second, we relate the change in catching-up prospects to migration. 
 
5.2. Overview of the scenarios 
The scenarios we present are illustrative. Although there is a widespread consensus that 
economic catching-up of the new member states will probably continue (see eg European 
Commission, 2009), there are a lot of uncertainties regarding the speed with which this is 
likely to occur. The same applies to old member states of the EU, as the right-hand panel of 
Figure 4 indicated. The previously successful catching-up process of Portugal halted after 
euro-area entry and that of Spain reversed after the recent bursting of the real-estate 
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bubble. Endogenous growth theories suggest that each country has a specific anchor which 
secures its convergence path, which is determined by various social, economic and 
institutional factors. This anchor is not necessarily equal to the average of advanced 
economies. We do not aim to determine the long-run anchor, partly because it depends on 
future policies as well, but aim to set up scenarios that we regard as broadly plausible.  
We first set up a ‘pre-crisis’ scenario using information available in 2007 that will form the 
basis of a comparison with ‘crisis’ scenarios, for which we create two ones.  
The ‘pre-crisis’ scenario is based on actual data up to 2006 and the October 2007 forecast of 
DG ECFIN which includes forecasted values for 2007-2009. Hence, our scenarios are relate to 
2010 and beyond.  
The ‘crisis’ scenarios are based on the available forecasts in April 2009, which include 
forecasts up to 2010. Hence our scenarios relate to 2011 and beyond. For the ‘crisis’ 
scenarios we simulate a ‘benchmark scenario’ and a ‘hard hit scenario’. 
The benchmark scenario is based on available forecasts for all countries up to 2010. In our 
scenarios for 2011 onwards, we assume that GDP growth between 2001 and 2010 is equal to 
potential growth in 2011 for those five countries that did not accumulate excessive current-
account imbalances (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). For the 
other five countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania), however, we assume 
a change in the growth model, since it seems highly unlikely that these countries will able to 
run double-digit current-account deficits in the future. As Chart 6 indicates, there was a 
strong relationship between GDP growth and current-account imbalances among the new 
member states in the past. Consequently, the average growth of the past decade may well 
overestimate their potential growth rates. We have assumed that the potential growth rate 
for 2011 of those countries with large current-account imbalances is equal to the average 
potential growth rate of the other five countries, which is 4.2 percent per year.  
The hard hit scenario assumes a deeper recession both in the EU15 and in the new member 
states in the near future and a durable effect on the new member states in the medium 
term. The IMF and the OECD in their March 2009 forecasts emphasised strong downside 
risks. Any worsening of the outlook for the EU15 will probably have a more than 
proportional effect on the new member states through trade links. Furthermore, there is a 
risk that subsidiaries of western European banks in new member states may curtail credit to 
a larger extent than what would have been justified by the economic conditions in these 
countries, while domestically owned banks have anyway largely been deprived of foreign 
funding. Credit contraction in the new member states is likely to aggravate the economic 
crisis (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry, 2008). For these reasons, the speed of future catching-up (ie 
excess growth over EU15 growth) is assumed to be one half of historical averages and the 
long-run structural unemployment rate is also assumed to be higher in the new member 
states. The hard hit scenario also assumes that there will be an additional ten percent 
exchange-rate depreciation for countries operating flexible exchange-rate systems.  
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Figure 6: GDP growth and the current account, 2003-2007 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Eurostat. 
 
5.3. General assumptions for the scenarios 
We derive our scenarios using the same principles and will alter the parameters of the model 
in the different scenarios. 
In all scenarios we assume that that catching-up, that is, excess growth of real GDP 
compared to EU15, is fast when a country has a much lower per capita GDP than the EU15, 
but the speed decreases as progress is made in catching up. This assumption is in line with 
the empirical findings of the growth literature. Such behaviour can be conveniently modelled 
with a logistic function: 
( )
( ) ( )tPOPY
POP
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tEU
PPS
ti
PPS
⋅−+
=
γβα exp
1
,15
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     (3) 
where ( )
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Y
,
)(
 indicates GDP per capita at PPS in country i at time t and α, β and γ are 
parameters. One can calibrate these three parameters so that equation (1) matches (a) per 
capita GDP at PPS relative to EU15 in the starting year, (b) per capita GDP at PPS relative to 
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EU15 in the long run, and (c) the initial speed of catching-up, that is, the excess growth of 
per capita GDP of country i over per capita GDP growth of EU15.  
The scenarios for GDP per capita at current exchange rates6 relative to EU15 are derived on 
the basis of these PPS scenarios and assumptions regarding the relationship between PPS 
and actual nominal exchange rates that we refer as ‘real exchange rate’ for simplicity. For all 
scenarios we assume that the real exchange rate continues to appreciate in parallel with the 
convergence in GDP per capita at PPS. The speed of convergence of real exchange rates and 
GDP per capita at PPS is assumed to be proportional. The long-run level of the real exchange 
rate is assumed to be equal to our assumption on the long-run ratio of GDP per capita at PPS 
compared to the EU15. Another way to phrase this assumption is that the price level relative 
to EU15 will be the same as GDP per capita at PPS relative to EU15. 
The employment ratio, which is defined for simplicity as one minus the unemployment rate, 
also appears in our model. We have assumed that the unemployment rate reverts to its 
long- run structural equilibrium in three years’ time and that the convergence path to this 
equilibrium is a linear process.   
 
5.4. Detailed assumptions about the scenarios 
The pre-crisis scenario (October 2007 scenario) 
(a) Initial level of per capita GDP at PPS: We calculate the forecasted value of GDP per 
capita at PPS for 2009 based on the 2006 actual data and the October 2007 forecast 
of DG ECFIN for 2007-2009. Consequently, all scenarios are made for 2010 onwards. 
(b) Long-run level of per capita GDP at PPS: We assume that the long-run anchor of the 
growth process is 90 percent of EU15. As can be seen from Chart 1, this is roughly the 
average of current Spanish and Greek values. 
(c) Initial speed of catching-up: the excess growth of per capita GDP at PPS is set equal to 
actual excess real GDP growth from 2000 to 2009 which, as indicated above, includes 
actual data up to 2006 and the 2007 forecasts for 2007-2009. It would have been 
reasonable to assume that the average growth during this nine-year period could 
well proxy the potential growth rate.7  
                                                          
6 Since we are studying migration from the new member states to the EU15, the individual country exchange 
rates are also defined against the EU15, ie a weighted average of euro, pound sterling, Swedish krona and 
Danish krone. 
7 To be more precise, we divide the GDP level in 2009 with the GDP level in 2000 and calculate the average 
annualised (compounded) growth rate in this period. Note that our sample for calculating the initial speed does 
not include the period of the Russian crisis, which seriously affected some of these countries. 
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(d) Real exchange rate: No real exchange-rate shock is assumed, ie the gap between PPS 
and actual nominal exchange rate-based GDP per capita evolves according to our 
general assumptions discussed above.  
(e) Unemployment rate: Similarly to (a) above, we calculate the forecasted value of the 
unemployment rate for 2009 based on the 2006 actual data and the October 2007 
forecast of DG ECFIN for 2007-2009. The long-run anchor of the unemployment rate 
is set equal to the structural unemployment rate of 2007 as included in the AMECO 
database. This rate is reached (according to our general assumptions) in two years 
from the final date of the forecast (2009), ie it is reached by 2011. 
 
The 1st crisis scenario – baseline scenario (April 2009 baseline scenario) 
(a) Initial level of per capita GDP at PPS: We calculate the forecasted value of GDP per 
capita at PPS for 2010 based on the 2008 preliminary data and the April 2009 
forecasts for 2009 and 2010. Consequently, all scenarios are made for 2011 onwards. 
(b) Long-run level of per capita GDP at PPS: The same as in the pre-crisis scenario, ie 90 
percent of EU15. 
(c) Initial speed of catching-up: For five countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia) the excess growth of per capita GDP at PPS is set equal to actual 
excess real GDP growth in 2000-2010, which includes actual data up to 2008 and the 
2009 forecasts for 2009 and 2010. For the other five countries that had large current 
account imbalances (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania) the initial GDP 
growth is set equal to the average of the other five countries in 2011, which is 4.2 
percent per year.8 
(d) Real exchange rate: For the four countries operating floating exchange-rate systems 
we assume that the average nominal exchange rate of January-May 2009 will prevail 
for the rest of the year.9 This implies exchange-rate depreciation compared to 2008. 
The real exchange-rate depreciations are assumed not to alter the future price 
convergence prospects (ie we do not take into account possibly higher inflation due 
to the exchange-rate depreciations), but the real exchange-rate appreciation process 
is assumed to be governed by our general assumptions discussed above from the 
                                                          
8 Note that we have projected GDP per capita at PPS compared to the EU15. We assumed that the change in 
GDP per capita at PPS compared to EU15 is fully the result of excess real GDP growth. In order to be able to 
derive an absolute GDP growth number for the new member states, we need an assumption for GDP growth 
for the EU15. For the later, we again used April 2009 forecasts for 2009 and 2010 and assumed that it will be 2 
percent per year starting in 2011.  
9 The average exchange rates from 2 January to 25 May 2009 against the euro are 27.27 (Czech koruna), 292.05 
(Hungarian forint), 4.46 (Polish zloty) and 4.23 (Romanian leu). Note that we used a weighted average of the 
exchange rate of the EU15, that is, the average of euro, pound sterling, Danish krone and Swedish krona 
exchange rates. 
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depreciated level in 2009. The real exchange rates of other countries (ie the two 
euro- area countries and the four countries that operate fixed exchange-rate 
systems) are not affected.  
(e) Unemployment rate: We use the same principles as in the pre-crisis scenario, the only 
difference being that we use April 2009 DG ECFIN forecasts until 2010 and assume 
that the same long-run structural unemployment rate is reached by 2012. 
 
The 2nd crisis scenario – deeper crisis scenario (April 2009 hard hit scenario) 
(a) Initial level of per capita GDP at PPS: We subtract two percent from 2009 and one 
percent from 2010 annual GDP growth forecasts of the new member states and one 
percent and 0.5 percent from the growth forecast of the EU15 in these two years. We 
use these values to forecast the 2010 GDP per capita level at PPS compared to the 
EU15. 
(b) Long-run level of per capita GDP at PPS: The same as in the other two scenarios, ie 90 
percent of EU15. 
(c) Initial speed of catching-up: We assume that the crisis has a longer-term effect on 
growth as well and that the average GDP growth rate over a historical period 
overestimates the potential growth rate. Consequently, we calculate the average 
excess growth over EU15 growth for all countries for the period 2000-2010 (including 
the downgraded 2009-2010 forecasts as indicated in point (a) above) and assume 
that the initial speed of catching-up will be one half of these historical values for the 
five countries that did not have large current- account imbalances (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). For the other five countries (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania), again the initial GDP growth is set equal to the 
average of the other five countries in 2011, which is 3.0 percent per year. 
(d) Real exchange rate: We assume that there is an additional ten percent nominal 
exchange-rate depreciation for those four countries that operate floating exchange- 
rate systems (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania). 
(e) Unemployment rate: The unemployment rate in the new member states is assumed 
to be two and one percent higher in 2009 and 2010, respectively, than the April 2009 
DG ECFIN forecasts, while in the EU15 the additional rise in the unemployment rate is 
assumed to be one and 0.5 percent in these two years. Furthermore, the long-run 
structural unemployment rate is one percent higher in the new member states than 
in the previous two scenarios. 
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Table 6 presents the numerical values for GDP growth scenarios between 2005 and 2013 and 
highlights the various sources. 
Table 6: Real GDP growth scenarios (percent) 
 scenario 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Bulgaria 2007 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.0 6.2 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.4 
 2009BM 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.0 -1.6 -0.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 
  2009HH 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.0 -3.6 -1.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Czech Rep. 2007 6.3 6.8 5.8 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.7 
 2009BM 6.3 6.8 6.0 3.2 -2.7 0.3 4.2 3.9 3.7 
  2009HH 6.3 6.8 6.0 3.2 -4.7 -0.7 3.0 3.0 2.9 
Estonia 2007 9.2 10.4 7.8 6.4 6.2 7.8 6.8 6.0 5.3 
 2009BM 9.2 10.4 6.3 -3.6 -10.3 -0.8 4.2 4.1 4.1 
  2009HH 9.2 10.4 6.3 -3.6 -12.3 -1.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Hungary 2007 4.1 3.9 2.0 2.6 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.5 
 2009BM 4.1 3.9 1.1 0.5 -6.3 -0.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 
  2009HH 4.1 3.9 1.1 0.5 -8.3 -1.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Latvia 2007 10.6 12.2 10.5 7.2 6.2 8.5 7.8 7.2 6.6 
 2009BM 10.6 12.2 10.0 -4.6 -13.1 -3.2 4.2 4.2 4.1 
  2009HH 10.6 12.2 10.0 -4.6 -15.1 -4.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Lithuania 2007 7.9 7.9 8.5 7.5 6.3 7.7 7.1 6.6 6.0 
 2009BM 7.9 7.9 8.9 3.0 -11.0 -4.7 4.2 4.2 4.1 
  2009HH 7.9 7.9 8.9 3.0 -13.0 -5.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Poland 2007 3.6 6.2 6.5 5.6 5.2 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 
 2009BM 3.6 6.2 6.7 4.8 -1.4 0.8 4.2 4.1 4.1 
  2009HH 3.6 6.2 6.7 4.8 -3.4 -0.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 
Romania 2007 4.2 7.9 6.0 5.9 5.8 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.6 
 2009BM 4.2 7.9 6.2 7.1 -4.0 0.0 4.2 4.2 4.1 
  2009HH 4.2 7.9 6.2 7.1 -6.0 -1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Slovenia 2007 4.1 5.7 6.0 4.6 4.0 4.2 3.5 3.1 2.7 
 2009BM 4.1 5.7 6.8 3.5 -3.4 0.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 
  2009HH 4.3 5.9 6.8 3.5 -5.4 -0.3 3.0 2.9 2.8 
Slovakia 2007 6.6 8.5 8.7 7.0 6.2 6.1 5.6 5.2 4.9 
 2009BM 6.6 8.5 10.4 6.4 -2.6 0.7 5.7 5.4 5.0 
  2009HH 6.6 8.5 10.4 6.4 -4.6 -0.3 3.8 3.7 3.6 
EU-15 2007 1.8 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
 2009BM 1.8 2.9 2.7 0.7 -3.9 0.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
  2009HH 1.8 2.9 2.7 0.7 -4.9 -0.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Note: Yellow colour=actual data; blue colour=forecasts by DG ECFIN; orange colour=our assumptions; no 
colour=our scenarios. Note that our scenarios are not forecasts, but hypothetical medium term scenarios that 
are derived on the basis of our various assumptions discussed in the main text for the purpose of assessing the 
prospects for medium term migration flows. Sources: DG ECFIN, EIU, IMF, Danske Bank, Eurostat, Bruegel. 
 
5.5. Results 
Figure 7 compares the outlook for GDP per capita at PPS and at current exchange rates 
relative to EU15 for our three scenarios. The benchmark scenario indicates that the outlook 
(relative to EU15) has seriously deteriorated for the three Baltic countries and also to some 
extent for Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. For four countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Poland) the outlook relative to EU15 does not change much. The hard hit scenario, 
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however, indicates a considerable deterioration in all new member states especially at 
current exchange rates.  
Figure 7: Scenarios of GDP per capita at PPS and at current exchange rates (EU15 = 100), 
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Note. The ‘Oct 2007’ scenario uses actual data up to 2006, the October 2007 forecast for 2007-2009 and our 
scenario for 2010-2020. The ‘April 2009’ scenarios use actual data up to 2008, the April 2009 forecasts for 
2009-2010 (downscaled in the hard hit scenario) and our scenarios for 2011-2020. Actual data is from Eurostat; 
sources of forecasts are detailed in the note to Table 5. See further details in the main text. 
In Figure 8 we compare the evolution of employment rates according to the previously 
specified assumptions. Perhaps the most important outcome here is the rapid but short- 
term decline in the employment rate in the EU15. This results in a substantial increase in the 
labour market search costs for migrants in the short run, thereby reducing the incentive to 
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migrants (or increasing the incentive to return from abroad).  Similar drops in the 
employment rate can be observed in the countries of origin, especially in the three Baltic 
countries, while in the four less vulnerable countries the drop is less marked. Also, it is likely 
that the impact of local and foreign employment rates on migration decisions will not be 
symmetric, simply because many of the more successful migrants are employed at home 
when they leave, so their migration decision in not much influenced by their local 
employment rates. 
Figure 8: Employment rate scenarios, 2000-2020 
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Note: The employment rate is defined as one minus the unemployment rate in our paper. The ‘Oct 2007’ 
scenario uses actual data up to 2006, the October 2007 forecast for 2007-2009 and our scenario for 2010-2020. 
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The ‘April 2009’ scenarios use actual data up to 2008, the April 2009 forecasts for 2009-2010 (downscaled in 
the hard hit scenario) and our scenarios for 2011-2020. Source: Actual data is from Eurostat; forecasts are from 
the DG ECFIN. See further details in the main text. 
 
Having constructed these scenarios and gaining some qualitative understanding of what 
their migration impact might look like, we are naturally led to the next question, which is 
how to best attempt to quantify the likely migration effects. This issue is dealt with in the 
next section. 
 
6. Migration in the wake of the crisis 
 
The empirical results of the panel error correction model for the level of the migrant stock in 
the EU15 and our macroeconomic scenarios allow us to simulate the future developments in 
the migrant stock. We should emphasise that even though we have attempted to make our 
simulations as reliable as we can, there is a large degree of uncertainty and a non-negligible 
margin of error in the set-up of the exercise and in the assumptions. 
The three simulations of the level of migration under our three scenarios indicate that the 
crisis does affect net migration flows, but the effects are relatively small compared to the 
total stock of migrants. In other words, we do not expect any massive change in aggregate 
migration behaviour between old and new member states in the coming year. What we 
would expect are some significant changes at the margins.  
In order to see those significant effects at the margin more clearly, we plot the expected 
deviations of the migration stock from the 2007 scenario due to the crisis in Figure 9.10 This 
confirms the original intuition that migration is likely to dip in the short run as a result of the 
crisis and return to the pre-crisis scenario level by around 2019 in the baseline scenario on 
the average of the NMS10. In the hard hit scenario, however, the NMS10 migration stock 
may end up at a higher level in the longer run. At the beginning of 2007 there were 
approximately 3.8 million migrants from the ten new member states in the EU15. Our 
simulations suggests that there will be about 170 thousand less migrants by 2011 due to the 
crisis and about 200 thousand more by 2020 according to our hard hit scenario, which are 
around five percent of the current stock. 
There are, however, important country-specific differences. The four less affected countries 
(Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) are mostly projected to experience less 
migration outflows than without the crisis; it is even true under the hard hit scenario for 
Slovakia and Slovenia, thanks to their less affected catching-up process. By contrast, hard-hit 
                                                          
10 For a detailed analysis of long-run migration trends see Brücker et al (2009), with which our results are 
broadly consistent. 
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countries like Latvia are expected to experience only a small drop in emigration as a result of 
the crisis and rapidly move towards more emigration on account of its overall worsened 
position relative to the EU15. 
 
Figure 9: Change in the stock of migrants in the EU15 compared to the 2007 scenario 
(number of people), 2007-2020 
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Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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7. Summary 
With the Irish experience we illustrated how labour mobility has acted as a buffer both in the 
upswing and in the downturn. We then proceeded to attempt a quantification of the cyclical 
elements of migration in a regression model. We found that cyclical variables such us 
unemployment and growth rates have substantial explanatory power when it comes to 
migration flow, well beyond what can be explained by income differences alone. Also, our 
regression offers some evidence that the impact on migration of changes in the 
unemployment rate in the receiving country may be bigger than that of change in the 
unemployment rate in the country of origin. This suggests that the search cost in the labour 
market in the receiving country may indeed be a key cyclical determinant of migration. 
We then constructed scenarios for the future of the EU economies until 2020, placing 
particular emphasis on the possibility that the growth model of some of the new member 
states that was based on extremely high current-account deficits may have suffered long 
term damage as the result of the crisis. Using these economic scenarios and the regression 
parameters previously obtained, we find that migration flows from East to West are likely to 
be depressed by the crisis in the short run but will rebound in the medium term. 
Our findings have numerous implications. From the perspective of the receiving countries, 
migrants help with the short-run response to the economic cycle in two important ways. 
First, there is evidence, not least from Ireland, that migrants bear a disproportionate risk of 
losing their job during the downturn. Conversely, of course, job creation for migrants will 
tend to be disproportionately faster than for natives. Hence, the migrant workforce acts as a 
labour market buffer that can, to some extent, shield the native workforce from fluctuations 
of the business cycle including the present economic shock. Second, rising unemployment 
rates in the host country will, in the short term, reduce the net inflow of migrants on 
account of greatly increased search costs for new arrivals to find a job. As a result of this 
reduced net inflow, unemployment in the receiving country is set to increase by less than it 
would otherwise have done. 
From the perspective of the sending country, the impact of these developments will 
generally be less benign for a number of reasons. First, as employment abroad decreases 
rapidly (more rapidly than that among natives in the receiving country), so will remittance 
flows that support the local economy in the sending country. Second, the rise in 
unemployment in response to the crisis is likely to be exacerbated by the reduced net 
outflow of migrants. This effect might, in the short run, even be sufficiently strong to lead to 
a reversal in net migration flows. Hence, the sending countries are likely to be relatively hard 
hit in the short run. The sending countries do not have the option of temporarily debarring 
migrants from returning to their country of origin on account of the economic crisis for 
obvious legal and ethical reasons.  
However, sending countries stand to benefit in the medium term. In our empirical estimates 
we find that the reduction in migration outflows in response to the crisis will only be 
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temporary and likely be followed by a subsequent increase in East-West migration due to a 
less favourable medium-term outlook in some of the sending countries in eastern Europe in 
the aftermath of the crisis. In other words, the short-run pressures on labour markets in 
sending countries may be alleviated through the migration channel in the medium term. Or, 
if viewed probabilistically, it can be said that labour mobility offers eastern Europe an 
insurance against a speed limit in terms of catching up with the EU15 in the aftermath of the 
crisis. 
The corollary of this is that receiving countries will experience the buffer effect of migration 
only in the short run. In the longer run, worsened economic prospects in some of the 
sending countries would lead to a rebound of immigration to the EU15. To the extent that 
immigrants create wealth for the native population in the host country, this might be a 
welcome prospect. But to the extent that increased migration flows continue to be regarded 
as problematic in some host countries, this could even induce EU15 countries to consider 
some kind of support to labour markets in distressed sending countries. 
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